This article argues that questions of gradual institutional change can be understood as an evolutionary process that can be explained through the careful application of "generalized Darwinism." We argue that human's advanced cognitive capacities contribute to an evolutionary understanding of institutional change. In constantly generating new variation upon which mechanisms of selection and replication operate, cognition, cognitive schemas, and ideas become central for understanding the building of human institutions, as well as the scope and pace of their evolution. Evolutionary theories thus provide a broad theoretical framework that integrates the study of cognition, ideas and decision making with other literatures that focus on institutional change and human evolution.
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In recent years, political scientists have devoted considerable attention to the problem of explaining institutional change. Institutions change all the time, but as many have argued, the theoretical and epistemological tools used by political scientists are better equipped for the study of equilibrium and stasis.
1 Put simply, change has been a vexing problem for rationalists because they tend to assume relatively static preferences, as well as for historicists because they tend to see institutions as consistent and stable constraints on behavior.
This article argues that gradual institutional change can be understood as an evolutionary process. We do not use evolution as a metaphor. Instead, we contend that human social institutions literally "evolve" and that this process can be understood as one example of "generalized Darwinism." 2 We do not mean to suggest that biological evolution and institutional evolution are identical processes. Instead, we build on the growing body of literature that argues that biology is just one arena in which evolutionary processes take place.
We also argue that an evolutionary approach to social institutions dovetails remarkably well with similar trends in the literature on institutional change both within political science and in cognate fields of study, including economics, sociology, anthropology, and psychology. We show the link between institutionalist scholars in political science and the work of the growing 1 Margaret Levi, "A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis," in 3 institutional evolution offers the possibility of bringing human cognition and "ideas" back into our understanding of change.
of organization-at the cell, organism or group level. They may be quite independent of variations at the genetic level." Evolution in Four Dimensions, p. 110.
Evolution as a General Theory
Richard Dawkins is credited with coining the phrase "universal Darwinism," which refers to the notion that evolutionary processes can be reduced to a very simple algorithm: variation, selection, retention. 5 In this view, the evolutionary change does not just apply to biological phenomenon. It is, instead, a universal phenomenon that characterizes a wide variety of complex systems. "Modern evolutionary theorists," Eric Beinhocker summarizes, "believe that, like gravity, evolution is a universal phenomenon meaning that no matter whether the algorithm is running in the substrate of biological DNA, a computer program, the economy, or the substrate of an alien biology on a distant planet, evolution will follow certain general laws in its behavior." 6 Charles Darwin, and later Karl Popper, believed that evolutionary theory might be applied beyond biology to explain the evolution of human language, knowledge, and culture. 5 continued variation. In biology this mechanism is random genetic variation. Dennett suggests, however, that this need not be the only generator.
We argue that humans' creative capacities and problem-solving abilities are important mechanisms for generating continued variation in human social systems. Humans' creative capacities and their advanced ability to generate novel ways of solving collective action problems are perhaps the most distinctive features of our species. While all social creatures have elaborate social rules that govern behavior (in other words, institutions), humans' remarkable facility for questioning, breaking down, changing, or creating new rules distinguishes the human species. Human creative cognitive capacities therefore can help explain the complexity of political institutions, the opportunities for new variation to emerge, and the likely rates of institutional change.
Anthropologists Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd have also argued that humans' advanced cognitive capacities and decision making are key institutional selection mechanisms.
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In the biological world, mutations are repeatedly tested within the environment. The environment selects those mutations that are relatively fit. We submit that human's advanced capacities for learning are a key selection mechanism for institutional evolution. Clearly, processes of constant iterated trial-and-error learning are manifested extensively throughout human social systems. Karl Popper also argued along these lines, observing that "trial and error" methods are central to the evolution of knowledge. Similarly, Eric Beinhocker has used the concept of "deductive tinkering" to explain economic innovation and development. 10 In these Finally, for there to be evolutionary change, the system must have mechanisms for retaining selected variations. We elaborate below how the mind's cognitive schemas develop within institutional and social systems and thus become part of the intergenerational transmission of collective norms and behavior. Routines, schemas and cognitive frames are at once in the individual actor's mind and part of the social structures and processes in which they are
constructed. As such they become key mechanisms facilitating the intergenerational transfer of both beliefs and norms. Humans are reasoning creatures, but only rarely do we recalculate and 'rationally' assess all choices possible when making a decision. Since we form these mental schemas in a densely institutionalized ecology, the interaction between institutions and the mind becomes the mechanism for the retention collective social behavior over time.
This ensures that innovations are replicated and proliferate within the system.
Understanding the means of institutional replication allows one to explain the proliferation of political paradigms across time, as well the scope of continued variation of alternative ideas within the system.
The final sections of this article make the case that humans' creative intellectual and communicative capacities define the speed and scope of institutional evolution. The cognitive basis of institutions-built on well-ingrained cognitive schemas-makes them particularly malleable and susceptible to emergence of new ideas. At their most basic cognitive level, institutions are sets of mental rules and schemas that drive our desires to reduce and replicate specific behaviors in specific contexts. Ideas perform the same function as mutations in 7 biological systems-imperfectly replicating institutional structures in a way that generates new variation and hybrid forms of change over time. It is precisely the abilities of social animals, such as humans, to copy behavioral schemas and social rules that make complex social organization possible and endogenous institutional change more rapid than is often assumed.
What Evolution Is and Is Not
Understanding evolutionary institutional change as a product of a theoretical algorithm of generalized Darwinism distinguishes this model from other theories of change that look at an array of specific mechanisms and proximate causes for local phenomena. In this framework, institutional change adheres to the basic algorithm noted above. Simple one-off deviations in an agent's behavior, or their single efforts to shape behavior with new rules and laws, will not cause "institutional evolution" unless that policy idea is both "selected" by decision-makers and "replicated" across other individuals, organizations, and institutions. A schema must survive and eventually replicate if it is to have a truly "evolutionary" impact on institutions.
Evolutionary theory is an "interactionist paradigm." 11 What this means is that the theory does not a priori privilege either structural (that is, selection) or agency-centered (that is, variation) explanations. Both are key component parts of the overall evolutionary process. 12 We emphasize cognitive/agency based arguments in this essay, but we do not wish to imply that broader environmental mechanisms are not also at work. Our argument is not thus different from, Nadav Shelef's, who divides explanations for the evolution of Israeli nationalism between top-8 down "elite imposition" factors and bottom-up "rational adaptation" on the part of agents. 13 In
Shelef's framework only the latter is considered "evolutionary," while the former is deemed "rational." In our framework, "elite imposition" structural factors are selection mechanisms that winnow certain ideas relative to others. "Rational adaptation" from below represents one variant among many possible adaptive responses to relative structural pressures. The collective decisions of agents at the grassroots level also constitute a selection mechanism operating at lower levels of analysis. In sum, an evolutionary framework does not privilege the direction of causality. Selection and variation are essentially different components of an overall endogenous "evolutionary" account of institutional change. While certain mechanisms of change may be relatively more important at different points in time, generalized Darwinism focuses solely on the process of change as a basic ontological condition.
Given the widespread misconceptions and political misappropriations of evolutionary theory in the past, it is very important to understand that evolutionary outcomes are not necessarily efficient, linear, or optimizing. Darwin did not invent term "survival of the fittest," and evolution by natural selection was not conceived of as an aggregated optimization algorithm.
Nor are these misconceptions embraced by evolutionary theorists today. 14 By natural selection, However, numerous traits can survive simultaneously without being the optimal solution to an environmental challenge. The notion that evolution implies a clear, consistent, and progressive optimizing pattern-or a linear change toward greater complexity-is fundamentally wrong.
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Moreover, numerous social scientists have documented how a myopically generated selection or advantage in one part of the system often creates problems for other bureaucracies-giving rise to "institutional friction" within a political system. 17 As we will outline below, the inherent frictions in complex social institutions are re-enforced by the imperfections in how institutions are replicated. 15 Hodgson and Knudsen, "Why We Need a Generalized Darwinism." 16 The widespread misconception that evolution implies a progressive optimizing pattern has been appropriated for benign programs, such as the progressive movement in the United States, as well as heinous acts, such as Nazi eugenics. Highlighting these misconceptions and promoting an accurate understanding of evolutionary theory remain important challenges for evolutionary social science.
Finally, it should be understood that evolutionary systems are rarely at equilibrium.
Though one may find long periods of relatively slow change -what is more correctly called stasis -true equilibrium is impossible both because the environment in which systems evolve changes and because an evolutionary system itself generates continued variation. This approach is thus different from an approach that assumes systems reach equilibrium and are occasionally disturbed or punctuated.
Choice and Evolution
Some critics of generalized Darwinism have argued that humans are uniquely intentional in their behavior, making "biological analogies" inappropriate explanations. According to the critics, one of the most remarkable features of humankind is our highly developed cognitive capacity. We are self-conscious, capable of building and sustaining highly complex social organizations, and able to quickly learn and copy behaviors from others to a greater extent than any other species. Richard Nelson, for example, argues that these attributes raise important questions about the mechanisms of human institutional evolution, because strategic choice means that the process of change does not occur only through "blind" genetic replication.
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Human agents intentionally design social institutions. One of the most interesting challenges when applying evolutionary theory to human social institutions involves the incorporation of human cognition and agency into the theory precisely because in biological evolution outcomes are non-purposive. 19 Once again, specific evolutionary changes are the products of myopically generated trial-and-error tests within a specific ecological context. While one can argue that the "purpose" of the system at its most general level is to increase the chances that the individual will be able to pass on its genes, one cannot say that specific behavioral or genetic changes are the products of conscious "decisions" inside the system. Human social institutions evolve differently precisely because human cognitive capacities make it possible for individuals and groups to consciously choose institutions.
These considerations have led some evolutionary scientists to revisit Lamarckian theories of evolution that point to the inheritance of "acquired" traits. According to Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, individuals acquired traits over the course of their lifetime from the use or disuse of certain functions and were able to pass these traits to later generations. In other words individuals were able to pro-actively adapt to environmental challenges rather than simply be the passive recipients of selection pressures. As evolutionary theory has developed, Lamarckianism has become juxtaposed against Darwinism and has been labeled the "incorrect" form of Their framework bolsters the case for applying generalized Darwinism to explain human institutions because communication and the proliferation of ideas provide an additional "nongenetic" inheritance system that fosters additional mechanisms for evolutionary change.
Richerson and Boyd add:
Given that decision rules derive from the action of selection on genes and hence are adaptive, on average at least, a system that responds both directly to natural selection and to adaptive decision making forces will be able to adapt to varying environments more quickly than can organisms that adapt by genes and nontransmitted learning.
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In other words, human cultural evolution may be faster than biological evolution because ideas and beliefs replicate and adapt more rapidly than biological organisms. Jablonka and Lamb similarly argue that "the symbolic inheritance system" explains the unique qualities of human and thereby generate friction between subsystems, which is often a primary driver of further change.
In sum, an evolutionary approach to institutional change places human cognition, intentionality, and agency at the center of the analysis. Humans have displayed an advanced capacity to generate new rules (variation); they strategically choose between different institutional schemas (selection); and they often imperfectly implement, copy, or repeat successful behaviors (replication). In the following section we attempt to specifically show how modern institutionalist approaches have moved towards evolutionary theory.
Evolutionary Foundations in the New Institutionalisms
Institutionalists are searching for a better understanding of the mechanisms of political change. The analytic problem is that most political science models are static. Rational-choice institutionalism perceives any given institutional setting as eventually reaching an equilibrium in which "no one has the incentive to change his or her choice." 24 Consequently the only source of change is exogenous. As Levi argues, "it is obvious that choices change regularly and perspective on institutions and view them as "complexes" of rules rather than unified, seamless and consistent constraints. Secondly, the institutionalists, instead of focusing exclusively on either structure or agency, contend that interactions between the two drive change.
The new institutionalists implicitly moved in the direction of evolutionary theory when they gradually revised their original conception of institutions as independent, self-reinforcing and essentially stable constraints on behavior. They, instead, view institutions as sets of rules embedded within the broader institutional milieu of a polity. As Streeck and Thelen point out, "a general problem in contemporary institutional analysis" is that it "always emphasized structural constraints and continuity." Viewing institutions as "frozen residues, or 'crystallizations', of previous political conflict" had proved theoretically inadequate and did not match empirical reality. 
Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Institutional Change
While it is beyond the scope of this article to address fully all the complex issues involved in a full-blown, comprehensive theory of institutional change, generalized evolutionary theory does provide both an explicit framework for understanding the mechanisms of change, and a broad conceptual framework for integrating a wide array of nuanced theories related to these processes. To date most innovations in the literature on endogenous institutional change have been ad hoc and based on either particular questions or distinct analytical problems. They have lacked an overarching theoretical framework that ties the innovations together and helps shape thinking in the field. An evolutionary framework does just that. It helps integrate and explain many of these analyses, and thus illuminates an ongoing research agenda for an interrelated body of theories of gradual institutional change. While not presuming to present a complete theory of institutional change, the second part of this article highlights existing social- science research in three areas and thereby contributes to the building of an integrated body of research.
Cognition, Preferences and Variation
The origins of preferences and sources of agent variation have been the focus of a growing literature on the evolutionary foundations of political preferences and human decisionmaking. 47 Such work has been supported by the cognitive revolution in psychology and the social sciences as well as work in cognitive neuroscience that "has also begun to incorporate emotion and motivation into cognitively oriented theories of choice." Conversely, historicists tend to see preferences as far less stable and instead argue that institutions structure preferences. 51 Katznelson and Weingast, for example, contend that they can "derive" preferences based on the "compelling logic of institutions embedded in particular historical situations." 52 The problem with these two traditional approaches is that neither helps to explain change because both reduce preferences without investigating their origins and both tend to view preferences as relatively consistent across individuals. In other words, there is little explanation of agent variation or how preferences change. and psychological models of decision making complement each other and contribute to more robust theorizing on the origin of preferences. 68 In addition, imperfect replication of the genetic and institutional rules that drive human behavior means that a certain degree of agent variation will continually and always exist.
This leads to a two important analytical points. First, one should expect significant agent variation even within the same local institutional system. Second, simply knowing that agents vary in their preferences, or even what an agents basic preference structure is, will likely not be sufficient to explain behavior. To understand which cognitive schemas and ideas are activated and proliferate requires a detailed analysis of the interaction over time of agent preferences with institutional and environmental mechanisms of selection. The following section theorizes about these selection mechanisms.
Selection
Humans, more than any other species, have evolved complicated mechanisms and institutions to shape behavior and promote cooperative strategies that benefit their groups. To understand these developments, evolutionary theorists have employed the concept of "group selection" and the theory of "multilevel selection" (or, MLS). 69 Thus, evolutionary history is not 76 This explains why a tipping point, followed by rapid "punctuated" change, often follows long periods of relative stasis. 77 To understand how a particular institutional reform (in other words, adaptation) performs, social scientists must consider how these changes interact with other existing institutions. This implies greater attention to the co-evolution of institutions. 78 
Replication and the Nature of Institutional Change
Institutions can be understood as rules that are passed from one generation to the next, that are imperfectly replicated over time, and that must be understood as part of the broader 76 N. Gontier, "Evolutionary Epistemology and the Origin and Evolution of Language: Taking Symbiogenesis environment in which they operate. However, the means of replication in political and biological systems differ in important ways. To understand replication, one must investigate the means by which information is structured and transferred to latter generations (in other words, the genes of politics).
At the most basic level, sociologically oriented scholars have defined institutional replicators abstractly as "schemas" or "routines," 79 which are the cognitive rules that tell individuals that given situation X, one should do Y. Institutions are thus defined as intersubjectively understood schemas about formal and informal rules of behavior. Johan Stein, for example, argues that institutions are a mental construction of the world created through a process of "reduction and elaboration." 80 Because individuals' attention and cognitive capacity are limited, humans rely heavily on such "schemas." They perform a similar role as "ideas" 81 or distinction makes it relatively easy to understand why institutional rules never perfectly replicate behavior. Replication relies on the uncritical acceptance of and adherence to rules. As long as individuals vary in their conceptions of the content and implementation of rules, then imperfections in replication (and hence variation) will continue within a system. Moreover, while institutional schemas are designed to structure or "select" certain behaviors, they do not always determine behavior and often allow for multiple solutions to a given problem. 83 Like selection more broadly, institutional rules allow multiple specific behaviors to exist simultaneously at the micro-level.
A second important difference between institutional and biological replication is the ease by which institutional schemas can change. Given human's advanced capacity for communication and learning, there are limits to the biological analogy of vertical evolution through inter-generational and "unconscious" genetic change. 84 Despite the significance of institutional schemas, humans have a unique ability to generate new ideas and institutional innovations (in other words, mutations) that other humans can intentionally copy and replicate.
The notion of inter-subjectively understood schemas makes it easy to understand the ample opportunities for alternative ideas and variations to emerge, as well as agents' flexibility in reinterpreting rules. Indeed, a defining aspect of institutional evolution is that it is driven by 84 For example, Nathalie Gontier, in "Evolutionary Epistemology and the Origin and Evolution of Language:
Taking Symbiogenesis Seriously," argues that theories of genetic change based on biologically based theories of natural selection are inadequate for the study of human language and culture. Humans' capacity to actively borrow and re-combine traits gives these institutions peculiar properties that are better explained by "horizontal" evolution. that researchers analyze not just a particular rule, but also (1) how that institutional rule interacts with other elements in the system and (2) constraints on the replication of that rule.
In sum, focusing research on the process of institutional replication-that is, the scope and pace by which schemas proliferate, are embedded, and change-illuminates fundamental questions about the basic mechanisms of institutional change. While genetic change in the biological world is relatively slow and occurs over multiple generations, human institutions are often built with the capacity to incorporate feedback and to make multiple adjustments within a 96 Lieberman, "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change." 37 single agent's lifetime. Humans' advanced capacity for information transfer and their ability to learn from mistakes and to incorporate rapidly new information about institutional fitness mean that evolutionary institutional change is likely to proceed much faster than what occurs through unconscious genetic replication. As one anonymous reviewer noted, the body politic may discard policy innovations much more easily than does a biological organism that screens genetic mutations. Nevertheless, policy ideas that "fail" to be adopted at one point are never permanently eliminated. Instead, they ensure continued variation and, by remaining possible courses of action, expand the scope for future rounds of selection.
This iterated variation-selection-replication process highlights how power holders within regimes select and direct policy ideas. But the relative success of institutional rules is known only after implementation, when the rules' interactions and functions in the political system have been repeatedly evaluated. The rapidity with which this process is iterated can raise testable hypotheses about the importance of the rate of change, or the "evolvability" of a system. Such research would focus on the opportunities for new ideas to emerge and proliferate, on their selection, and on mechanisms that constrain selection. For example, one might hypothesize that in polities that allow for greater diversity of ideas, new ideas emerge and variation occurs at a faster rate than they do in relatively closed polities. Democracies, moreover, may be faster to adapt responses that are broadly popular and slower to deploy rule changes that are unpopular.
Conversely, autocracies may stifle economic innovation by stifling learning and ideational change. Likewise, more complex bureaucracies may be more difficult to change due to the friction generated between multiple agencies and interests.
Conclusion
This article has not offered a complete model of institutional evolution. Our intention is 38 to introduce the reader to increasingly common notions of generalized Darwinism and to suggest that these concepts offer significant insights for understanding endogenous institutional change.
This framework helps researchers move away from a reductionist and static ontology to one that highlights change and the importance of complexity, variation, and interaction. According to this perspective, institutional replication and change arise primarily from the proliferation and internalization of ideas and cognitive schemas. By integrating ideas into the analysis of institutional change, generalized Darwinism makes institutions both replicators of behaviour and objects of contestation.
Integrating ideas into institutional analysis also allows for a better understanding of mechanisms of institutional evolution. The internalization of ideas is affected by the ways that ideas are framed, the degree to which they are perceived as a relevant solution to current environmental challenges, and the extent to which they are undermined by negative feedback.
Ideas are the product of agent variation at the micro-level, are impacted by selection pressures, and are imperfectly replicated. Even if institutions adopt certain ideas and preferences, variation will continue to characterize the system. Darwinist principles provide a solid foundation for thinking about all of these phenomena.
Viewing institutions in this way also integrates analyses of agency and structure because of the focus on the iterated interactions of agents and their environment. One could argue institutionalism in the past was overly structural, and that actors were viewed incorrectly as hostages of the institutions that they inhabit. By conceptualizing institutions as inter-subjectively understood schemas, scholars who analyse institutions can better understand the considerable space for agent variation and for the creation of new ideas and strategies that impact how institutions function and evolve.
39
Political scientists generally, and new institutionalists specifically, have already adopted many elements of this framework. But they lack a comprehensive foundation for integrating these various lines of research. An evolutionary framework does not supplant current lines of research but, instead, serves to highlight them, integrate them, and outline areas that require further elaboration.
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The framework, in addition, points to areas for future research, regarding the emergence and proliferation of policy ideas, the mechanisms of selection and feedback, and the evolutionary potential of different systems. This is of course not an exhaustive list. It is simply one step in defining a more comprehensive and robust agenda for studying political change. 97 In a recent Polity article, Ian Lustick has shown how much of the historical institutionalist literature can benefit from key evolutionary concepts and theories. I.S. Lustick, "Taking Evolution Seriously: Historical Institutionalism and Evolutionary Theory," Polity 43, (2011).
